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COMMENTARIES ON KEYNOTE 
PRESENTATION m 
- 
Affordances and the Practice of 
Industrial Design Engineering: 
Comments on Smets's Presentation 
A question that struck me when reading Gerda S m d  (this issue) arricle on 
i n d u d  design enginedng is how the ecological theory of pmrption and 
aaion and espeCraUy the study of &rdances may contribute to the practice of 
indusaial design engineering. Manufactured products are made to be p~ceived 
and to invoke behavior by being perceived. Such go& require that the products 
of hdusaial design be meaningful €0 behavior, that is, that they provide the uset 
with oppormnities for discovering and exploiting afloldancles. &dances are 
the kind of properties that are or should be at the core of such products. 
However, I see a problem, namely, how to define and measure the affordances 
char those products are designed to provide. 
Studtes such as those on the perception ofthe affordanas of r im heights of 
srairs (Mark, 1987; Wamn, 1984) and the affordancces of the width of door 
apenin%s (Warm & Whang, 1987) s u ~ ~ e s t  that affordam are confined to the 
individual products thernsehres. Such a n m w  focus on the individual product 
is problematic for understanding the tools that many of the produ~ls of 





























from everyday life, namely, the examples of spoans and chairs. Research on 
panidpants' perception of the affordance of doar openings and risa h&hts 
suggests that what counts as the afbdance are the dimensions oirissrs and d m  
opedngs that & the relevant body dim& for climbhg passing 
thmugh. When weapply this insight to bpbo~lsand chairs, we would expet that 
spoons are meaningful for behavior to the extent that they can be grasped and 
held by the hand, imd chgirs, to the extent that they afford wmfoctable sitting. 
This is obviously ner m e  for spoons and, to some exrenr, also tror for chairs. 
There aremany objects that canbe comfortably h e k h t  are nevertheless d e s s  
for eating. Tlrere are chaits that can hard. ly becanfmably sat upon but that are 
mv&thelew loved by thek owners because they mean snnethlng to the 
behavior of their owmrs. F Q ~  example, a pianist needs a chair that ensbks his or 
ha amur andshoulders to be free frompemrrbitlg forces, bur =&a chair would 
provide little comfort for sitting, especidly in the absence ofakeyboard that the 
piadrst touches whik sittiiig. Tools such as spoons are dcdignd not only to be 
(hehiby rhe hand but alsa to uansport foodin a &wa$ acceptable way. These 
sxmplles show that the study of affordanceb of objeas not only collcgms the 
rdadon of the object to the user but also the reladon of the o b w  to otherparts 
of d~ environment in which use of the object ct embedded. Momover, the 
rehion of user to the environment may be b g e d  when an objemforms part 
ofthe dkthkiq ofthe user, and as a w~sequence, new oppoWtie6 arise for 
the b v e r y  of new atEdanas. 
Fwidut me of the afkirdance wneept require8 us to think through the 
changinp dadon h e e n  the organism aud the environment. The ecological 
theory of perception and a&n views the organism and the envimment as 
mu- related paas of one unified 8y6tem. Nevdeless, the organism is 
tteared as separated froln the environment 'by a stria tmdary of its receptor 
surfaces and skin, This boundary is &en for gmn& However, the ecological 
psychology that, for example, Gibson was working on wn&ved of the organism 
as sepataced from the enpiionmcm by a 1- fixed and arable boundary (see 
Gibson, 1979). In fact, the boundaq may change con6inuoudy and momen- 
tarily. This can easfly be shorn by a very simple example of object raar;lpula- 
don. Any hand-held rod, even when gtaaped just to carry it to anodta place, 
will cause mevic and kinetic ehaagea in the prehensile system as a whole, When 
W a n d  &eaive anion modes emerge on the basis of kinetic and metric 
prop& ofthe action system and task demands, new action modes may arise 
or loss of Bdsting action modes map o~eur because ofthe way a hand-held rod 
has inmntane~usly changed the system. Hand-held objem and wcn the 
objectawe s i t o ~ h m e p a n o f o u r b o d y j u w b y h o 1 ~ ~ a a d s i c t i n g o n  
thenp. These actialdes change the boundary ofenhnment and organism. At 
the Icuel ofbehaviod organbadon and mnttol, there exism not an anaromieal 
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to the environment may instantaneously and momentarily become part of the 
organism. 
What are the consequences of this view of the organism for the way we should 
look at the affordances of objects, especially manufactured objects! The answer 
is that we should look at manufactured objects as products that are made to 
change the body and the action modes of an actor. The affordances they offer 
are not just what the products themselves mean to behavior but also what the 
environment means to a momentarily changed organism when the product 
becomes part of the body. How different the affordances are that may be 
discovered when action modes are differently changed can be illustrated by a 
discussion between two children that 1 overheard years ago. Both children had 
arrived at the same place, a French harbor on the Normandy coast. One child 
had arrived at this place by sailing along the coast in a small boat. It took her 
many days to arrive; strong winds, seasickness, wet suits, and other discomforts 
had to be overcome on a sailboat in the North Sea. The other girl had traveled 
by car and had spent only a few hours (albeit boring ones) in traveling to the 
same place. The two girls talked about what their experiences were, how far 
away they were from home, and the efforts that would he needed to return. 
Their discussion focused on the different affordances they discovered while 
traveling, that is, what the distance from home meant to them. This meaning 
was so different that it was difficult for them to understand each other. The 
affordances they had discovered were not what the vehicles they had used meant 
to behavior hut what the environment had offered them when these vehicles 
changed their effectivities for travel. 
Our view of manufactured products can be obscured not only by the way we 
conceive of the organism, but also by the way we conceive of the environment 
and objects. Products are manufactured to be used. The amactiveness of their 
shape and color may be one aspect that is of interest, but their function is 
another one. A function is not something that an object owns, such as its 
outline and size, but something the object shares with another object. For 
example the function of a knife emerges at the interface of the cutting edge of the 
knife and a surface that is cut. Cutting requires a cutting edge, a surface to be 
cut, and a force that pushes the cutting edge through the surface. Functions are 
often conceived of as entities that are superimposed on an object and that need 
to be inferred from the object itself. The reason one conceives of functions as 
superimposed entities is, perhaps, the striking unity and boundedness of objects. 
This leads easily to the assumption that the outline of the object is all there is. 
However, as Gibson (1979) clearly argued years ago, an object is not just an 
outline but a relation. It is a relation of surfaces. When we perceive theunity and 
boundedness of an object, we perceive, in fact, a relation of surfaces. This is not 
the only relation that may be perceived directly. Objects do not populate an 
empty space. They are located in front of other surfaces and are supported from 
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